Construction of the European Neighborhood Policy. From a Regional Policy to a Local Approach: EUBAM to Moldova and Ukraine

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Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to present the institutional dynamics of an international unique instrument which is the European Neighborhood Policy. This research is important in the field of European Construction because it studies the intercourse between the aims of this institution and its practical accomplishments. Unlike other similar research, this paper wants to bring a deeper approach regarding the activity of the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine. The method used was a case study of the ENP towards the Republic of Moldova. Through the systematization and interpretation of previous empirical studies and numerous press articles this work offers a clear image of the activity and results of the EUBAM to Moldova and Ukraine. This paper may elicit a more analytical interest for research groups interested in the efficiency of some entities that define the European construction but it can also be useful to European or local political decisional factors. The key contribution of this paper consists of emphasizing the interdependence between solving a specific neighboring policy in the East and ensuring energy needs of the EU, largely dependent on the Russian Federation.

Keywords: European Construction; European Neighbourhood Policy; Republic of Moldova; Transnistrian region

Introduction

The construction of the European Union after the fifth round of enlargement was completed on 1 January 2007. That makes it necessary to pay more attention to what is happening outside the borders of this major player on the international scene. Developing and reinforcing cooperation with its partners is a principal aim of the EU (Cannizzaro 2002, 298). The official statement of the EU in connexion with its external relations is that international cooperation is essential and meeting objectives will only be possible through joint multilateral efforts within international organisations. This in turn must be coupled with partnerships involving other key players1.

When we are talking about the institutional level, the EU has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy and also a European Security and Defense Policy (Eeckhout 2004, 141). This policies want to be concret, coherent and common action plans for all the member states. Because it has to respond to a the question of putting toghether the diferent tipes of relations, preferential or disputes for example, between UE states and nonUE states and also to the diferent perception of the 27 member

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1The official statement of the EU regarding it’s external relations is: „The sheer size of the European Union in economic, trade and financial terms makes it a world player. The biggest trader and home to the world’s second currency, the EU also spends over 7 billion euro a year on aid to developing countries. Its trade and partnership agreements cover most countries and regions.” ( www.europa.eu ).
states of how this relations should work, is very hard for the European Union to reach consensus at the institutional level and to harmonize these different points of view.

**The Philosophy of the European Neighbourhood Policy**

A specific approach of the EU to foreign relations is related to its own neighbours. It is a new overview in international relations, a new look at what borders represent because of the specific of the European Union, as a union of culturally different states. This original policy, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), is presented as carrying a deeper or wider set of intrinsic European characteristics and qualities (Ifersen & Kølvraa 2007, 3-5). It refers to the „outsiders” from the East and from South and it wants to bring stability, security and welfare both in the EU and its new neighbouring countries by increasing cooperation in the political, economical, social and cultural areas as well as on security issues. Yet, it is obvious from the start that this policy in which the EU should be surrounded by a „ring of friends” is passive to a dihotomy that is: while it wants to increase confidence between EU member states and non-EU states by bringing them together in a plan of good cohabitation, the EU borders are becoming more and more secure and rigid; countries that are now at the periphery of the EU (as Romania) are being asked to strengthen security at the borders of the EU and to make it harder for citizens from the states included in the ENP that want to emigrate and live in the EU to cross the borders of the EU (Smith 2005, 758).

The origins of the ENP date only to early 2002, when the United Kingdom pushed for a substantive „wider Europe” initiative, to be aimed at Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, but not the south-east European countries (already involved in the stabilization and association process) or the more distant western former Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In December 2002 the Copenhagen European Council approved the idea in a political message to the countries now lying on the Union’s new external borders, including the southern Mediterranean countries in the initiative, on the insistence of southern member states. In June 2004, after a lobby by the Caucasian republics (and the peaceful „rose revolution” in Georgia), the Council extended it still further to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (Smith 2005, 760-62). Russia has declined participation, preferring to develop relations and cooperation with the EU on a more „equal” basis, developing four „common spaces” (economy; freedom, security and justice; external security; research and education) and has been granted special status as a „key partner of EU” (Comission 2004, 4).

The ENP expands over a very large geographical area, and inglobes a wide diversity of countries. The ENP concentrates on developing „privileged” bilateral relations between the EU and individual neighbouring countries (Bindi 2010, 113). The principal aim of the ENP is to bring stability in the area

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1 The name of the initiative has been changed as many times as the list of neighbours included in it: from ‘wider Europe’ to „proximity policy” to „new neighbourhood policy”, and finally to „European Neighbourhood Policy”.
2 „The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004, with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all.” (www.http://ec.europa.eu/world/epol/policy_en.htm).
3 Strategy declared that „building security in our neighbourhood” is one of three strategic objectives for the EU: „Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.” (European Council, A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 dec 2003, 8). The phrase „ring of friends” was first use by Romano Prodi in his speech (Romano Prodi, „A wider europe—A Proximity Policy as the key to stability”, speech at the sixth ECSA-world Conference, December 5-6 2002).
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and to create good economical relations\(^1\). It also supplements, though it does not replace, other frameworks for relations with the Union’s neighbours: the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (also the related Euro-Mediterranean agreements and the MEDA assistance programme which is the principal financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership), and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and TACIS assistance programme with the former Soviet republics. Two ENP countries, Belarus and Libya, are not formally linked to the EU by an agreement and have in fact been the subject of EU sanctions. (http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/european_union/belgium_and_the_eu/external_relations/europe_and_the_world/european_neighbourhood_policy/index.jsp).

The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Republic of Moldova

In this picture a particular place is held by the states at the East border. These countries are very important for the economy, security and policy of the EU; they represent a possible space to enlarge, also a big sale market for the products coming from EU and an important security area (Popescu 2011, 4-6). So we can see from the begining that the European Union in it’s Neighbourhood Policy has a different approach regarding the East neighbouring countries from those of the South. Relations with the shore of the Mediterranean Sea are treated in the ENP most of all from a economical point of view while the neighbours from the East are, for the EU, possible future member states so the politics regarding them are made in this context\(^2\).

In this framework a special place is taken by the EU politics towards the Republic of Moldova. The ENP towards this country is composed by this instruments: the mission of assistance to the moldo-ukrainian border EUBAM (European Border Assistance Mission), the Action Plan signed with this country, the EU Special Representative, European Commission delegation office, visa and trade facilitation and also from the participation of the EU as an observer in the negociations of the transnistrian conflict.

With Romania’s entrance into the European Union in 2007, the EU now shares a border with Moldova, „a weak state divided by conflict and plagued by corruption and organised crime”\(^3\). Moldova’s leadership until the 2009 elections has declared many times its political program to join the EU, but its commitment to European values was suspect, and efforts to resolve the dispute with the breakaway region of Transnistria have failed to end a damaging deadlock that has persisted for so many years. The new leadership seems to be more dedicated to the aim of joining the European Union and embracing european values but, because of the political structure now existing in the moldovian parliament it does not have the necessary support to take concrete actions. Young people have little confidence in their country’s future and are leaving at an alarming rate towards the EU (Moldova’s Uncertain Future 2006, 3).

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\(^2\) „The European Union is open to any European country which is democratic, has a market economy and possesses the administrative capacity to handle the rights and obligations of membership. This means enlargement is an ongoing process.” (http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm) official statement of the EU regarding the enlargement process.

\(^3\) This is the conclusion towards the situation in the Republic of Moldova that the International Crisis Group reached (Moldova’s Uncertain Future. Europe Report N°175, august 2006, International Crisis Group, Brussels).
Moldova needs to become a stable part of the EU’s neighbourhood policy and for that a much greater international engagement is needed, not only in conflict resolution but also in stimulating domestic reforms to help make the country more attractive to its citizen.

The EU has become more heavily engaged in Moldova since 2005 but relations between the two date since 1998 when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed on 1 July. The PCA provides an institutional framework for political dialogue and for pursuing common objectives in various areas, including the establishment of good economic relations, sustainable development, cooperation in certain economic fields, and support for the democratic process in Moldova (www.eubam.org).

On 22 February 2005, on the occasion of a meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, a three-year Action Plan – developed in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy – was adopted. On 25 October 2007 the Cooperation Committee decided to extend the Action Plan for a further year as all the objectives had not yet been met. The main priorities of the EU-Moldova Action Plan are in the fields of: administrative and judicial systems, freedom of expression and freedom of media, economic policy and legislation, conflict resolution, border management, migration management, human trafficking, organised crime and money-laundering (http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/european_union/belgium_and_the_eu/external_relations/europ e_and_the_world/eastern_europe/#4).

EU has declared its actively supports in conflict resolution process in Transnistria in full coordination with the OSCE. The EU wants to act as an observer in the in the mediation process and for that has set up, together with Moldova and Ukraine, an EU mission at the border between these two countries.

On 23 March 2005, the Council adopted a Common Action appointing an EU Special Representative for Moldova with the goal – next to other tasks – of strengthening the EU’s contribution to solving the frozen conflict in Transnistria (in close coordination with the OSCE) and developing close contacts with the Moldovan authorities and other actors on the ground. (http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/european_union/belgium_and_the_eu/external_relations/europ e_and_the_world/eastern_europe/#4). On 1 March 2007, the first EU Special Representative, A. Jacobovits de Szeged, was succeeded in office by Kalman Mizsei (www.eubam.org).

The Commission established a representation in Chisinau on 6 October 2005 which was turned into an EU delegation upon the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. On 25 April 2007, a Common Visa Application Centre – hosted by the Hungarian Embassy – was opened in Chisinau in the presence of Commissioner Frattini who, on the same occasion, signed a visa facilitation and readmission agreement. On 18 February 2008, the Council indicated its willingness to move beyond the current PCA and reach a new agreement with Moldova, subject to sustained progress in the implementation of the Action Plan. This willingness was again confirmed at the Cooperation Council meeting of 27 May 2008, following a positive evaluation of the reform process in the Commission's progress report of April 2008. On 5 December 2008, the Commission presented the Council with a proposal for a mandate to start negotiations on a new agreement. (http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/european_union/belgium_and_the_eu/external_relations/europ e_and_the_world/eastern_europe/#4).

This are general actions that the EU did, in its approach on it’s eastern neighbor. All of these institutions that work in the Republic of Moldova are very important in bringing the European values forefront and in showing the support in developing the country. A special place between the policies
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from ENP in Moldova is taken by the European Union Border Assistance Mission\(^1\) to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), a new tool in the hands of the EU to help in the process of establishing a secure border at the East. The European Commission launched EUBAM and argued that it would not be a crisis-management mission so much as a depoliticized technical-support mission (Kurowska & Tallis 2009, 49).

**EUBAM and the Conflict of Transnistria**

Big actors on the international scene, like EU and Russian Federation, have interests towards the evolution of the „frozen conflict” of Transnistria. An important role in a future settling of the conflict is played also by the nearest neighbour of the disputed area wich is Ukraine. Former President of this country, Viktor Yushchenko, has made resolution of the Transnistrian conflict a foreign policy priority, at least in statements. In April 2005, he presented a peace plan that had unrealistic elements but signalled increased engagement of it’s country. Two months later, he made a joint request with Moldova-Ukraine border, across which the majority of Transdniestria’s smuggling activities take place. This led to an EU Border Assistance Mission in November 2005, which has had a number of early successes (*Moldova’s Uncertain Future* 2006, 6-7). The primary goal for the mission is to approximate the standars of the Moldovian/Ukrainian border and low enforcement authorities to it’s own and to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict (www.eubam.org).

Russia did not remain immune at these actions and possibly in reaction to these developments, but also perhaps symptomatic of its newly assertive posture toward all the former Soviet republics, Russia has become much more openly supportive of Transnistria as it shows its actions in 2005 to bann the import of some Moldovan foodstuff and in 2006 when it banned wine etc., the country’s largest export, which was widely seen as a political move to punish Moldova for its more Western alignment. In January 2006, a new intimidation from Russia towards Moldova took place by cutting the gas supply for sixteen days and then negotiated a 100 per cent price increase for future supplies\(^2\). After the implementation of the new Ukraine-Moldova customs regime, Russia increased its economic aid to Transnistria and signed a cooperation protocol with the separatist leader, Igor Smirnov, which for the first time recognised him as “President of Transnistria”\(^3\). Russia has also continued to resist calls to withdraw its troops in line with past commitments\(^4\). Moscow is also believed to have increased support to pro-Russian organisations in Transnistria that propagate anti-Moldovan and anti-Western views, such as the youth movement Proriv (“Breakthrough”). With Moldova and Ukraine declaring their desire to join the EU, there are fears among the EU officials that the Kremlin intends to use Transnistria to maintain its influence in a region that it is not prepared to concede to the West. All indications are that the Kremlin has no intention of relaxing its position on Transnistria in the foreseeable future (*Moldova’s Uncertain Future* 2006, 8-12).

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\(^1\) The creation of EUBAM is related not with the problems at the border of Moldova and Ukraine, but far away from these countries, in Aceh, Indonesia 2005 when the EU was invited to monitor a peace deal between rebels in Aceh region and the Indonesian government. See more in Pierre-Antoine Braud, Giovanni Grevi, *Institute for Security Studies* (Paris, France), *European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005, The European Union mission in Aceh*.

\(^2\) The price until 31 December 2005 was $80 per 1,000 cubicmeters. Russia and Moldova agreed on 16 January 2006 to raise this by 38 per cent to $ (dollars) 110; in July 2006, it was furtherraised to $ (dollars) 160.

\(^3\) In the past, agreements had been signed, “For Transdnestria, I. N. Smirnov”. The recent protocol was signed “President of Transdnestria, I. N. Smirnov”.

\(^4\) „Russia says troops to remain in Moldova’s Dniester region until conflict settled”, ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 31 May 2006.
However, progress is possible in a number of areas regardless of Russia’s level of cooperation and EU knows this well. These include trade relations, customs procedures and democratisation and media freedom, as well as confidence building.

In 2004, the European Commission included Moldova among the sixteen states in its new European Neighbourhood Policy, designed to enhance relations with countries on the EU periphery. (www.eubam.org)

The launch of EUBAM on 30 November 2005 was received by Moldovan authorities as a major step toward resolving the conflict with Transnistria. The mission’s official purpose is to boost the capacities of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border guard and customs services to combat criminal activities such as trafficking people, smuggling, proliferation of weapons and customs fraud, as well as to play an important role in building preconditions for seeking a peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict (European Commission press release, 29 November 2005).

The Mission does not intervene on a political level or play a direct role in any political process. It’s role in an eventual settlement of the transnistrian conflict is rather indirect by it’s technical/advisory support and it’s confidence-building measures. The top priorities of the mission, as they were drawn at Brussels are: border surveillance; contraband; customs fraud; combat corruption and to promote the EU values. As a response for the aspirations of the EU members states for regional security, stability and prosperity, EU asks this mission to approximate the standards of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and law enforcement authorities to it’s own and also to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict (www.eubam.org).

EUBAM in Action

Fully founded by the European Union within the context of the EU Neighbourhood Instument and with United Nations Development Programme as a implementing partner, EUBAM is a unique instrument that wants to encourage the movement of legitimate trade and travel and also to guarantee security for its citizens. The Memorandum of Understanding signed on 7 October 2005 by European Commision, the government of Moldova and the government of Ukraine is the legal basis for EUBAM. The mandate of the Mission has been extended twice (in 2007 and 2009). The current mandate expires on 30 november 2011 but is expected to be extended for another two years (www.eubam.org).

Its aproximately 200 staff members, led by Mr Udo Burkholder from Germany, are divided between Odessa headquarters, six field offices along the border (three along the Transnistrian segment), a field office in Odessa covering the Ukrainian Black Sea ports of Odessa and Illichivsk, and a Chisinau field office that monitors the internal border between Transnistria and the rest of Moldova. EUBAM experts monitor how the Moldovan and Ukrainian border guards and customs services do document checks and vehicle inspections, accompany border guards on occasional patrols, observe customs clearance and

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1 The management structure was debated in Brussels for weeks, with many member states hoping it could be run by the EU Council as a formal European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission and suspicious of the Commission’s ambitions. However, even those who were most reluctant to see the Commission take charge now praise the mission’s successes. Crisis Group interviews, EU member state diplomats, Brussels, September/October 2005 and March/April 2006.
2 Promoting European values is the difficult task but the team of the Mission responded by organising road shows and school presentations and by informing the population at the border on border-control issues and customs regimes using public information material.
3 Until 2009 the head of the Mission was Hungarian Major General Dr. Ferenc Banfi.
4 The Transdniestrian segment of the 1,200 km. Moldova-Ukraine border is approximately 470 km.

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procedures, foster cooperation and information-sharing between the two sets of authorities. The big problem of this mission is that it has no executive powers and cannot itself inspect or investigate suspected traffickers, but instead it can observe and advise local authorities and request that individuals or cargo be re-inspected in its presence. An analytical cell in Odessa helps process and evaluate the information compiled by field offices (Moldova’s Uncertain Future 2006, 11-13).

EUBAM’s findings and reports suggest that Transdniestria is not the arms and drugs trafficking “black hole” critics have long contended. It has found no evidence of organised arms smuggling and only minor drug trafficking. What it has discovered is organised smuggling on a massive scale of basic consumer goods and foodstuffs, in particular frozen chicken: most of the chicken imported to Transnistria was illegally re-exported. Profits are estimated at millions of euros per year. (Crisis Group interview, EUBAM, Odessa, May 2006).

At the basis of the Joint Declaration signed on 30 December 2005 by Prime Ministers from Ukraine and Moldova, all exports from all regions of Moldova to or via Ukraine must have proper Moldavian documentation and stamps (www.eubam.org). This is a measure against the illegal imports and exports from Transnistria but also wants to connect more efficiently the transnistrian business environment to the authorities from Chisinau.

EUBAM has found serious management deficiencies on both sides of the border and has made a number of recommendations to the Moldavian and Ukrainian governments with a view to bringing standards up to those in the rest of Europe. These include: upgrading information technology and communications equipment; giving all border agencies investigatory powers, improving daily information exchange, developing risk analysis capabilities and decentralising authority. The reaction to EUBAM and assessment of its performance have been almost universally positive. Moldavian, Ukrainian, EU and United States officials have praised the speed with which it was deployed, its impact on the ground in countering smuggling and improving cross-border cooperation and its political impact. The mission is widely credited with having created the conditions, especially technical ones, for the recent implementation by Ukraine of its new joint customs procedures with Moldova, long a goal of Moldova as well as the U.S. and EU so as to force Transnistrian businesses to cooperate with Chisinau. EUBAM also played a crucial role immediately after the new procedures were implemented in countering the Transnistrians’ assertions that the Ukrainian action amounted to an economic blockade and had created a “humanitarian catastrophe”. The political impact was thus felt almost immediately. The success of the counter-smuggling and training aspects of its mandate, however, is less clear-cut. There is some evidence that pressure on smuggling operations has increased, but there should be no illusions that the mission has ended the activity. The Moldova Ukraine border is 1,200 km. And topographically a smuggler’s paradise. The terrain is flat, with houses and farms straddling a frontier which in some areas is not signposted and has numerous lakes and rivers with large reed beds that provide cover for smugglers (Moldova’s Uncertain Future 2006, 20-25).

EUBAM has about 100 experts from the EU member states (www.eubam.org) on the border, and they are concentrated in a few teams that spend most of their time at checkpoints. Also worrying is that 95 per cent of goods that enter and exit Transnistrian border checkpoints do so by train (Crisis Group interview, EUBAM, Odessa, May 2006) EUBAM is at two of these transit points, but only Kuchurgan has equipment and facilities to inspect train cargo, and this is rarely done. Although EUBAM has not found evidence of arms trafficking, it cannot assert with confidence that it is not taking place.
EUBAM does not claim to be a physical deterrent to smugglers. Rather it works to improve the capacities of Moldova and Ukraine to protect the border themselves, including through risk analysis: You can’t control the border physically unless you build a Berlin Wall along it, so you need risk analysis to be able to predict suspicious movements of goods. For this risk analysis to work, you need effective information exchange between the Moldavians and Ukrainians (Crisis Group interview, European official, June 2006). By all accounts, information exchange has improved remarkably since EUBAM’s arrival but has a considerable distance to go. If cooperation between agencies within Moldova and Ukraine is anything to go by, this will remain a challenge long after EUBAM has departed. Relations between the Ukrainian border guards and police, for example, are atrocious so we are dealing here with a lack of interagency cooperation (Moldova’s Uncertain Future 2006, 26).

The border agencies lack of investigatory powers is another serious obstacle to effective risk analysis. Of the four services (Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs services respectively), only the Moldovan customs service has the power to investigate serious criminal violations. Such crimes are generally handled by the interior and state security ministries. The other services are authorised to deal only with low-level administrative violations. Personnel have little incentive to pursue organised crime, as cases are likely to be forwarded to another agency.

The problem is also one of attitude, experts say: there appears to be a reluctance to get at the roots of the problem. It’s easier to just do the basics and ignore the wider picture. Under the present system, border guards stop smugglers on a minor illegal crossing charge that guarantees one or two days in prison instead of following them and trying to learn more about and possibly bust a smuggling operation\(^1\) (Crisis Group interview, Kuchurgan, May 2006).

An issue EUBAM has raised with Kiev is that of smugglers obtaining advance knowledge of Ukrainian border patrols. Each border unit submits a weekly report to headquarters with a patrol plan for the next week from which it does not deviate so Kiev knows where every border patrol is in the country at any one time (Crisis Group interview, Kuchurgan, May 2006). This is information smugglers would gladly pay for. EUBAM has recommended delegating more power to field personnel to patrol based on daily intelligence rather than a pre-set schedule. But the problem of corruption goes far beyond patrol schedules; it pervades the border agencies of both countries. One reason frontline agents lack initiative is that they often do not know how high up in their own agency the corruption goes. EUBAM is working hard to overcome these obstacles but its resources are limited. Training is mostly just ad hoc, on-the-job advice in such areas as vehicle inspection and spotting false identification, with only a small classroom component for more senior officials. Since many border guards in both Ukraine and Moldova are military conscripts who spend only a year or two in the service, much of this training is quickly lost. Ukraine and Moldova are working toward phasing out conscript border guards and moving to fully civilian agencies but this will likely take several years. EUBAM has reportedly been a catalyst for this process (Moldova’s Uncertain Future 2006, 17).

Changing the mentality of the border guards and customs services may require decades as well as increased training, financial aid and external pressure. Only with a long-term commitment will it be possible to crack down on the array of smuggling schemes that the Transnistrians (and their business partners elsewhere) have perfected over the past decade and a half.

\(^1\) See also Crisis Group interview, Iurie Pintea, UNDP, Chisinau, May 2006.
Analysis of Results

The idea of a policy towards its neighbours is a new one and it has its origins within the decision of the fifth wave of enlargement. This new approach in international relations at what borders should represent and what kind of relations must be between a new entity with great economical potential (UE) and its close vicinity has crystalized in a short period, from the proposal of Great Britain in 2002 to the entry of the Caucasian republics in ENP in 2004. Even from the initial phase, the European Neighbourhood Policy had a very clear structure and concrete aims that were implemented in the sixteen country participating using the instrument of the Action Plans.

Regarding the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, ENP has developed a unique instrument that is the European Union Border Assistance Mission that has carried a activity whose results can not be denied. Besides reducing the smuggling at the border of Moldova and Ukraine, another important achievement of EUBAM, maybe the most important, is that it has reached a deep knowledge of the sources of insecurity in this area, especially those of economic nature. The negative factors that had been reached by ENP should have made the object for some improved efforts of eliminating them. The big problem of ENP and EUBAM in Moldova is that this logical operation couldn’t be completed. The reasons of this attitude appear to consist in the priority given to the economical relations between EU and Russian Federation that ensures the european energy security. So it is clear that the results of EUBAM or of other similar instruments depend on the harmonization of the two, now different, views (UE and RF) over the economical and political future of some countries of Eastern Europe. Until a consensus will be reached, the EU will play a very important role, using pawns like EUBAM in promoting the european values and in bringing it’s institutional models close to those of it’s neighbouring countries.

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