

## **The Implications of the Globalization in Defining the International Security**

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**Abstract:** We live in a new world, but there is neither new order nor disorder. There is a safety zone in Europe but also one of chaos and danger. What makes this world to be particularly difficult and dangerous is that different areas of order-disorder are interconnected through globalization. Before we can think of security requirements for today and tomorrow, we must forget yesterday's safety rules. A new world order could not become reality at all, but it may remain an ideal, especially for those living in the new European order. We must understand that we are not living in a world of pure and exclusive national interest. Human rights and humanitarian issues are inevitable in our political processes.

**Keywords:** globalization; security requirements; national interest

In the present world, a much more complex and ambiguous one, we might not face the same total threats or we may not need to use the same method, that is: total war. Generally, we should give up at the unconditional surrender as political purpose and objective.

The chaos of the pre-modern world? What should we do with such chaos? In the early '90s the answer seemed to be "the least possible." The chaos is not a threat like those which we already know - one armed attack by military forces of a neighboring state aggressor. It is true that the regions controlled by chaos create undesirable effects (drugs, disease, refugees), but they are not, however, threats to vital interests, which would attract the western military intervention.

First, the Westerners have learned that chaos is spreading. The collapse of Sierra Leone led to the destabilization of Liberia. Destabilization of Liberia endangered the neighbors, including Sierra Leone, even when the situation seemed to improve. In Central Africa, the chaos in the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Belgian Congo) is related to the tragic events in Rwanda and to the weakness of Burundi. Around Afghanistan, there were serious risks for Pakistan and post-Soviet republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Normally, when a Member ceases to function its borders no longer work either.

Partly, this is explained (this is actually the second thing learned by Westerners) by the fact that *when the state collapses*, crime takes its place. This is actually in a way logical. When it operates, the State exercises a double monopoly: one upon violence and the other upon the law. As the state monopoly on violence is lost, the law disappears as well, which is immediately replaced by crime. The pre-modern states are usually the scene of a series of civil conflicts, and then the wars against all for the control of resources. The lesson learned on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 shows that sometimes a zone of chaos can turn into a major direct threat from a distance. It is true that the circumstances in Afghanistan were unique. What remained of the Afghan state was taken over by the extremist Islamist regime which controlled

the state functions of different groups: the finance of drug barons, the health and social protection by UNO, several NGOs and the defense of Osama bin Laden. In exchange for shelter and some facilities to train terrorists, bin Laden offered personnel and weapons for maintaining a civil war with Masood Ahmed (most probably bin Laden helped in the Masood's assassination, because it seems too much for a coincidence his assassination only few days before the attacks in September). Fighters and terrorists came from different sources: some were members of "Arab Legion" which fought in the Balkans or in Chechnya, others came from Pakistan, and some were Westerners. All, fighters and terrorists were Muslims, most of them were, one way or another, participants of this prolonged crisis affecting the Islamic world from North Africa and Middle East. It is unlikely that these Afghanistan special circumstances may appear again or that the West would allow them to appear again. In any case, the West knew of these training bases, and it still allowed them to continue to operate; this fact, from the retrospective point of view is unbelievable.

But there is still a third learned lesson, which is the *chaos in some parts of the world should not be left to evolve unattended*. The difficulty lies in knowing what form of intervention should be applied. The Most logical procedure, in case of chaos seems to be the colonization. If the nation-state failed, why not going back to an older form of organization, that is the empire? Nation-state was a powerful engine for progress, but is far from achieving a guaranteed success. In its birth place, Europe, it reached to the interstate system which eventually led to the collapse of the balance, and the states have overcome their traditional limits in order to keep the system running. In a weird way, after two devastating wars, the Europeans, as adopted model which reduced the exclusivity of the nation-state, exported massively the nation-state model, in its original form, of their imperial subjects from other continents.

A limited voluntary form of imperialism is offered by the assistance programs of IMF and World Bank. In exchange for financial aid, which is actually a return ticket for being in line with the world economy, a country accepts the consultancy and supervision of these kinds of institutions. Sometimes it may take the form of some foreign officials placed within some ministries as advisers, which is often equivalent to give orders.

International Monetary Fund has defined globalization as "the growing international integration of markets for both goods and services, but also for the capital." The term "globalization" is used to explain and give meaning to specific content of contemporary capitalism, although not all processes of globalization are new. (Frunzeti, 2006, pp. 12-13)

A financial crisis can be managed through a limited imperialism form (voluntary), applied exclusively to the financial sector. When a crisis is widespread and the international community cares, a much broader form of intervention is necessary. The general also voluntarily imperialism takes the management form of philanthropic type, and is usually implemented by the international community through the United Nations, as in Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan. This form has been temporarily applied, for a shorter period, also in East Timor or Cambodia. By using this pattern it gives to the people a failed state in order to encourage the restoration of a sustainable state order. These arrangements are, however, as effective as the forms of the traditional imperialism. And that is why the new type of arrangement is voluntary, everything is subject to negotiations and compromise.

### **The European Security Environment in a Globalized World**

The European security, in the context of development towards a complete European Union, is no longer a collocation of broad and abstract use of semantics, but an acute operational reality, constantly

engaged in the vital aspirations paradigm that generate the existence and the development of the EU. The European community lives in the reality of a century open to geopolitical and geostrategic challenges that, ultimately, generates the need for a sustainable development, a development which is historically solid and socially credible.<sup>1</sup> Conceptual architecture of the European Security Strategy is based on the asserting argument that "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free", appreciating that "the violence in the first half of the twentieth century has left instead a period of peace and stability unprecedented in the European history"<sup>2</sup>

Determining the "responsibility for the development of global security and building a better world"<sup>3</sup>, the central thesis of the document, is generated by the geopolitical and geostrategic awareness of the fact that now, at the beginning of the XXI century, the "European Union is, inevitably, a global actor."

The most extended neo-imperial formula is the EU expansion. (Cooper, 2007) In the last few years, all Central European countries have transformed their Constitution, rewrote and reshaped, their laws, adjusted the market rules, developed institutional anti-corruption mechanisms and adopted a huge volume of European legislation, all for becoming members. The changes in Turkey, such as abolishing the death penalty or establishing the legal framework for minorities, are particularly spectacular. In another historical period such changes were possible only in the context of annexation by a colonial power, but the presented changes are based on a pure voluntary action, an action which aims at the integration into the empire: to ensure a seat at the table and a voice in government. If there would have been alone, some of the new EU member states would have failed, while taking "off the shelf" the models of constitutional and regulatory systems have not produced any harm; moreover, there are clear advantages of belonging to a supranational system to help them protect their own interests when dealing with countries the size of continents, as today's United States and future China. For other new Member States, the Union may provide a solution to the problems that the nation-state could not manage it. Cyprus, for example, has survived very well as part of Venetian, Ottoman and British empires, but as a nation-state it did not work. Currently, due to the integration, the European post-modern empire might return to a normal existence.

There is no doubt that globalization will force the citizens of the entire world to participate or to attend to profound changes, sometimes painful of their lifestyle. But if changes are profound and large, it might be the same for its opportunities. Globalization is positive or negative, depending on its place and how it relates to this country. (Zulean, 2003, pp. 116-121) The main agents of globalization were at first soldiers, merchants, preachers and adventurers, whose attempts are known since antiquity, in the writings of historians, as well as in the great epics bequeathed by world's greatest universal literature authors.

The fact that there is no new world order is already part of the common opinion. Much less is understood, however, the fact that there is still a new European order: new, because it has no historical precedent, then because it is based on completely new concepts. It is true that the order came before the concepts that defined it. One commentator, Henry Kissinger, who fails to understand this, although he understood the other things, better than any of us, describes them with great clarity and elegance, that "*in a world with actors that have operational forces more or less equal, there are only two paths towards stability. (Cooper, 2007) One is hegemony, and the other is balance*". (Kissinger, 29 March 1995) This was indeed a problem of fundamental option in the past. But today it is no longer valid.

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<sup>1</sup> Consolidated version of the Treaty regarding European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Brussels, April 30, 2008.

<sup>2</sup> European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, www.ue.com, Bruxelles, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 4.

Balancing produces instability, and now it is too dangerous. Hegemony draws resentments. Hegemony is hard to accept in a free world that values human rights and self-determination.

### **European Postmodern Order Facing the Same Challenges as the United States**

First, the danger is derived from the pre-modern world. We might not be interested in chaos, but the chaos might be interested in us. In fact, the chaos, or at least within its existing crime, needs a civilized world to plunder it. Open societies are easily penetrated. In its most negative form, terrorism, the chaos may become a serious threat to the entire international order. Terrorism means the privatization of war, pre-modern world with claws; if the terrorists will use biological or nuclear weapons, the effects could be devastating. This would be non-state attack on the state.

The second major threat emanates from the modern world. There is no state that would want to invade Europe now or in the foreseeable future. In a distant future, an armed and ambitious state, such as China or India, could affect the regional balance and thus to threaten the European interests; nevertheless a direct attack on the European continent seems unlikely. The real threat emanating from the modern world could come under the form of weapons of mass destruction, a danger that Europe is again sharing with the U.S. The European, postmodern response to these threats means imperial cooperative extension system. "I have no other way to defend my borders but to extend them," said Catherine the Great, and the European Union sometimes seemed to say the same thing. This is actually an accurate description of most natural security policy of a post-modern community state. The more extended postmodern network will be, the less risk will arise from neighbors, and so there will be more necessary resources for community protection, without requiring excessive militarization.

The third threat is specific to European postmodern world and it emanates from within. A postmodern world in which the security interests do not occupy a prominent place in people's minds, it is a world in which the state becomes less important. In the shelter created by NATO and EU, the states would weaken and fragment, especially if the devolution turns into decay. A mosaic of medieval states might become too diverse to organize and too diffuse to allow the necessary decision in security problems. From the historical point of view, the state was the most efficient form of organization in the security domain. The next decades will prove whether a union member will be as capable to combat the extreme threats since it has been able to eliminate the internal conflicts.

It seems that during the Western Europe, the era of the strong state, between 1648 and 1989, passed and now we are heading towards a system of overlapping roles and responsibilities between governments, international institutions and private organizations without having the control upon. We cannot help but wonder, if such a system would work? You should hope and try it.

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